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3 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. The Court of Appeals did not properly consider the 
constitutionally impaired order of the Trial Court denying 
visitation for nonpayment of child support. 
2. The Trial Court erred in termination visitation for 
the sole reason of nonpayment of child support. 
3. The Trial Court erred in conditioning the 
restoration of and the continuation of visitation upon the 
payment and compliance with support orders. 
4. The Trial Court erred in using it's contempt powers 
to deny and terminate visitation. 
5. The Trial Court erred in denying visitation by not 
requiring the defendant to file a petition to modify. 
6. The Trial Court erred in signing a order over the 
timley filed objection to said order. 
7. Should the Court of Appeals use Rule 31 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedures to preclude a written opinion 
on issues that are unique and substanical ? 
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JURISDICTION 
The Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals sought to be 
review is attached hereto as Exhibit "A", dated August 15th, 
1991. 
Rule 45 and Rule 46 of the Utah Courts of Appellate 
Procedure gives the Supreme Court the right to review the 
above decision of the Court of Appeals. 
This petition is filed according to Rule 48 of the 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF PACTS 
The petitioner filed for divorce on the 31st day of 
December, 1981, (Record at # 2). On the 26th day of August, 
1982 the divorce was granted to become effective after the 
3-month interlocutory period (Record at # 12-14). Petitioner 
agreed by stipulation to pay to respondent, the sum of 
$250.00 per month as child support, a sum that was equal to 
75% of petitioner gross income (Record at #7-10). 
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On the September 29, 1982 petitioner filed for 
protection under Chapter 7 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act. 
On the October 12, 1982, respondent filed a Order to 
Show Cause, (Record at # 20). In said Order respondent asked 
the Court to hold the petitioner in contempt. This was done 
before the divorce became final and while the petitioner was 
under the protection of the Federal Bankruptcy Act. 
After the petitioner's bankruptcy was discharged he 
paid the respondent all past due child support. 
On the September 27, 1982, respondent filed a Order to 
Show Cause (Record at # 40), asking the court again to find 
respondent in contempt. The contempt involved the property 
settlement and was previously discharged in the bankruptcy. 
Said O.S.C. was stricken on the 8th day of December, 1983 
(Record at # 47). Petitioner agreed to pay the past debt and 
a Order conforming to the agreement between parties was 
signed by the court on the 7th day of February 1984 (Record 
at # 53-55) . 
On the April 20, 1984 petitioner filed a motion to 
amend the divorce decree to allow the petitioner to expand 
his visitation because respondent unreasonably was denying 
him reasonable visitation (Record at # 60). Said motion was 
stipulated to and the Order granting said request was signed 
on the 21st of June 1984 (Record at # 65-67) 
On August 6, 1985 petitioner filed a Order to Show 
Cause because respondent was denying him visitation with his 
daughter (Record at # 68). Respondent agreed to allow 
visitation to resume and the O.S.C. was stricken. 
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On March 27, 1986, respondent filed a Order to Show 
Cause and Petition for Modification (Record at # 71 & 
74-83). In these Motions and Orders respondent wanted the 
court to hold the petitioner in contempt and to deny his 
visitation with his daughter, until he paid the past due 
child support payments, and then to restrict petitoners's 
future visitation. Judge Fishier denied respondent requests 
and allowed the petitioner to file a Petition to Reduce 
Child Support Payment and stayed any contempt proceeding 
against petitioner until a review of the ability of the 
petitioner to pay support is accessed. The petitioner was 
paying the respondent between $200.00 and $400.00 per month 
when the respondent filed her O.S.C. (Record at # 81-82). 
On April 14, 1986, petitioner filed his 
counter-petition for Modification of Divorce Decree (Record 
at # 87-88) . 
On April 22, 1986, Judge Sawaya signed the Order of 
Judge Fishier in which at #2 of the Judgement states "The 
issued of contempt against plaintiff for his failure to pay 
judgements and obligation is reserved until the hearing on a 
petition by plaintiff for modification of the decree of 
divorce which will address the issue of the Plaintiff's 
ability to pay said judgements." (Record at # 95-9) 
On October 14, 1986 the petitioner attempted to proceed 
with his petition to modify by filing a Request for Trial 
Setting. (Record at # 101). 
Commissioner Sandra Peular set a pre-trial settlement 
for February 13, 1987. (Record at # 104) 
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Respondent resisted any settlement and filed Objection 
to Request for Trial Setting. (Record at # 105). 
On March 17, 1988 petitioner was being denied his 
visitation and filed a Order to Show Cause to force 
respondent to allow his visitation with his daughter. 
(Record at # 111-2) . 
Respondent claimed it was unfair that she could be 
called to court to answer for denying visitation when 
petitioner was delinquent in his child support payments. 
(Record at # 125). 
On 18, April, 1988 Commissioner Peuler found no 
contempt of the petitioner at this time and respondent 
promised to allow petitioner his visitation from now on. 
(Record at # 129). 
On May 6, 1988, respondent filed a Order to Show Cause 
and requested that the plaintiff pay the full amount of her 
attorney fees, begin making child support payments with a 
weekly reduction of the judgement, and that plaintiff be 
advised that if he does not comply he will be arrested and 
jailed until he is willing to comply. (Record at # 135). 
Respondent filed at the same time a petition to deny 
petitioner alternate Friday visits. (Record at # 140) 
After several delays and continuances respondent's 
O.S.C. came before Judge Sawaya on October 3, 1988. 
Petitioner and his attorney were willing to stipulate to the 
conditions of the O.S.C. However Judge Sawaya made his own 
motion and ordered it be heard at the end of his law and 
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motion calender that day. Judge Sawaya then found the 
petitioner guilty of contempt, sentenced him to served 30 
day in the county jail, stayed imposition of jail sentence 
for 60 days to allow the petitoner to purge the contempt by 
paying the respondent a significant amount of money. (Record 
at # 170) 
During the month of November of 1989 the petitioner 
served his jail sentence. 
On February 24, 1990 respondent filed a Order to Show 
Cause, in this O.S.C. respondent requested the suspend 
visitation of petitioner until he is not in contempt of 
court and paying her support. (Record at # 214) 
On April 13, 1990 the Court canceled the hearing on 
respondent's O.S.C. and respondent filed a notice of 
continuance. (Record at # 258) 
On April 24, 1990, the petitioner appeared at the 
O.S.C. hearing and was told by the court clerk that the 
hearing has been cancelled and that the respondent would 
have to served the petitioner with a new O.S.C. before she 
could have her O.S.C. heard by the Judge. 
On May 21, 1990 the respondent, though her attorney, 
asked Judge Sawaya to issue a bench warrant for the arrest 
of the petitioner because he had not shown for the O.S.C. 
The petitioner had not been served with a new O.S.C. and 
therefore felt he did not have to attend, however, 
petitioner knew of Judge Sawaya bias against him and sent 
Ray Stoddard, a attorney that had represented him early in 
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this case, to inform Judge Sawaya that petitioner had not 
been served with the O.S.C. and that the petitioner and his 
attorney could be in Judge Sawaya court room within 15 
minutes if Judge Sawaya wanted to hold the hearing. Judge 
Sawaya stated that he knew what was going on and then 
issued a no bail bench warrant against petitioner. (Record 
at #254). 
When Mr. Stoddard told the petitioner of Judge Sawaya 
actions he directed his attorney to contact Judge Sawaya and 
have the warrant recalled. Only after Judge Sawaya was shown 
the docket printout showing the cancelling of the O.S.C. 
hearing did Judge Saway recall the warrant, however he ruled 
that respondent did not have to serve the petitioner with a 
O.S.C. and set the hearing for June 18, 1990. (Record at # 
256-9) . 
On June 18, 1990 Judge Sawaya found the petitioner 
guilty of contempt, denied all contact between the 
petitioner and his daughter, sentenced the petitioner to 
serve 39 days in the county jail and stayed the imposition 
of the jail sentence for 30 days to allow petitioner to pay 
the respondent some money. (Record at #262). 
On July 13, 1990 Judge Sawaya signed a Order over the 
timely filed objections of the petitioner, those objections 
were not frivolous nor were they filed as a delaying tactic. 
(Record at #268-71). 
On July 16, 1990, petitioner filed a Affidavit of Bias 
directed toward the conduct of Judge Sawaya. At the hearing 
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later that same day petitioner informed Judge Sawaya that he 
filed a Affidavit of Bias earlier and according to the Rules 
of Civil Procedures he could no longer proceed until the 
Affidavit of Bias were reviewed by the presiding judge. 
Judge Sawaya accepted a copy of the Affidavit but he stated 
he was not bias and then when on the review hearing. (Record 
at #298) 
On August 7, 1990, Judge Murphy denied petitioner 
affidavit of bias. (Record at #298) 
On August 13, 1990 petitioner filed a notice of appeal 
for for both the July 13 Order of Judge Sawaya and the 
August 7 Order denying the Affidavit of Bias by Judge 
Murphy. (Record at # 316). 
On October 10, 1990, the Court of Appeals vacated Judge 
Sawaya Order as it relates to visitation. 
On January 9, 1991 Judge Sawaya signed a Amended Order 
again denying petitioner visitation rights. 
Petitioner then asked the Court of Appeals to review 
the January 9th Order and stay the effect of said order 
until the case could be giving a fair hearing. 
On February 4, 1991, the Court of Appeals denied the 
petitioner's request for a stay. 
On March 19, 1991, petitioner filed for a Writ of 
Certiorari to this Court to review the denial of the request 
for the stay. 
On August 14, 1991 the Court of Appeals held oral 
arguments on the appeal of this case under Rule 31 of the 
Rules of Appellate Procedures. 
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that her father does not love her anymore because it does 
not want to see her anymore, a fact alleged in petitioner 
supporting affidavit for stay before the Court of Appeals 
and left unchallenged by respondent at the hearing or any 
other place. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TERMINATING VISITATION FOR THE 
SOLE REASON ON NON-PAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT. 
It should be noted at this point that respondant has 
admittedly abandoned the claim that the petitioner is unfit 
in anyway or degree except nonpayment of child support, (p. 
23 lines 14-21 of Transcript of Oral Argument of August 14, 
1991). 
The petitioner contends that although the January 9, 
1991 Order appears to have the best interest of the child as 
the cause for terminating visitation, the logic of Judge 
Sawaya is clearly founded only on the non-payment of child 
support. The primary premises is "Because the non-payment of 
child support has been willfull..." Judge Sawaya then goes 
on to deduces that it is in the best interest of the child 
not to see her father again. 
Judge Sawaya stated at the June 18 hearing "You make no 
real effort, as I see it, to pay any money to this woman to 
help support your own child. So I find you in contempt of 
court. I am going to take away your visitation privileges 
for that." Partial transcript of hearing dated 18, 1990. 
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In Lunsford v. Waldrip, 493 P. 2d 789, The Washington 
Court of Appeals, in a case very similar to the case at bar, 
states that the trial court findings were no more than a 
attempt to disguise the non-payment of child support 
payment. "We recognized that there can be good and sound 
reason to regulate or deny visitation privileges, but the 
order which is under review here does not cite any reason 
other that the failure to pay money that is due. Withholding 
visitation for the sole reason that money is unpaid and 
owing is an improper exercise of Judicial discretion." 
The Utah Supreme Court in Slade v. Denis, 594 P.2d 898 
stated "The general policy of the law is that a parent will 
be denied visitation rights only under extraordinary 
circumstances. This court is reluctant to deny all 
visitation rights, unless the child's welfare is jeopardized 
thereby." 
The Oregon Court of Appeals in West v. West, 487 P.2d 
96, stated "The rule that visitation may not be conditioned 
upon payment of support or support may not be condition upon 
cooperation in allowing visits is invoked to prevent Trial 
Court from punishing the recalcitrant parent through the 
children Right of visitation cannot be made dependant 
upon payment of support for children, in part because the 
welfare of the children underlie the allowance of visitation 
with children by the parent not having custody." 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Soderburg v. Solderburq, 299 
P.2d 479, stated "It is only under extraordinary 
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circumstances that a parent should be denied the right of 
visitation of a child." 
This court in Smith v. Smith, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 33 
stated "Modification of custody decree must serve the best 
interest of the child" you went on to say the best interest 
of the child are "promoted by having the child respect for 
and love of both parents. 'Fostering the child relationship 
with a non-custodial has important bearing on the child's 
best interest.1 Dana v. Dana, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 76, 78." 
The Utah Supreme Court in Rohr v. Rohr, 709 P.2d 382, 
stated "...the paramount concern in children visitation 
matters is the welfare of the child." 
The petitioner contends that Judge Sawaya believed at 
the June 18 hearing that he could terminate the petitioner 
visitation for the sole reason of non-payment of child 
support, as the transcript clearly shows. However, when his 
order was vacated by the Court of Appeals and told that he 
must conform to the Rhor decision of the best interest on 
the child, Judge Sawaya, who's June 18 hearing did not 
contain any testimony of evidence of the child's best 
interest, used generalities and attitudes to show the best 
interest was not to have visitation of parent-child. It is 
interesting to read the comments of Judge Sawaya when he 
agreed with the petitioner that "not being able to visit 
her, not being able to say that, it is very damaging to her 
as well as me." when he said "I am sure that it is." Partial 
transcript of June 18, 1990 hearing at page 3. It is clear 
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that when the bias actions of Judge Sawaya is view in 
overview of this case there can be no other conclusion that 
Judge Sawaya does not care about anything but punishing the 
petitioner, even at the expense his child. Appellant 
attitudes are that he does not accept Judge Sawaya handling 
of this case, since Judge Sawaya enter this case the matters 
has just deteriorated to the detriment of all involved, 
partly be cause Mr. Holgrem, defendant1 attorney knows, as 
he admitted in the motion for stay hearing before this 
court, Judge Sawaya will give him all the latitude he need 
to pursue the petitioner. Therefore in stead of negotiating 
a solution to this case, he maintains a position that 
petitioner cannot perform. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERROR IN CONDITIONING THE RESTORATION 
OF VISITATION RIGHTS UPON THE PAYMENT AND COMPLIANCE WITH 
SUPPORT ORDERS. 
The Utah Supreme Court of Utah in Rohr, supra, said 
,f
. . . conditioning any future modifications of divorce upon 
fatherfs prior compliance with support order impermissibly 
predicated father's future rights to modification upon 
happening of one predetermined event; modification would 
always be available contingent only upon material change of 
in circumstances." 
Judge Sawaya clearly is determining future visitation 
upon compliance with the payment of past due child support 
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and maintaining current support payment. Sense the July 18 
review hearing where Judge Sawaya allow petitioner to make 
child support in installment payments petitioner has 
maintain his child support payment. Judge Sawaya has 
continue to review petitioner payments and knew that 
petitioner was current with his payment when he conditioned 
restoration of visitation upon the payment of $450.00 for 4 
month consecutive/ and then if petitioner does not keep 
current the $450.00 then the respondent can without a 
hearing terminate visitation right. The sum of $450.00 is 
more than petitioner can pay and represents more than 50% of 
his income. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERROR IN USING IT'S CONTEMPT POTHER TO 
DENY AND TERMINATE VISITATION. 
The petitioner has found no cases in any jurisdiction 
allowing the termination of visitation for contempt for 
failure to pay child support. 
The Washington Court recognized that it is wrong to 
punish parents by denying visitation right when it stated in 
Matter of Marriage of Cabalquinto, 669 P.2d 886, "Child 
custody and visitation privilege are not to be used to 
penalize or reward parents for their conduct." 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING VISITATION BY NOT 
REQUIRING THE DEFENDANT TO FILE A PETITION TO MODIFY. 
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The petitioner contends that case law as far back as 
1900's have universally held, and later state statues 
confirmed, that visitation cannot be modified or restricted 
without filing a petition to modify. (U.C.A. 30-3-5) 
In the Rohr, supra, the case was brought before the court 
with a petition to modify, even in Rohr, the court did not 
deny all contact between parent and child, a case not only 
involving nonpayment of support but also visitation abuse. 
The petitioner contends that the issue was not properly 
before the court and in opposition with state statues, 
therefore this order must be overturned. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SIGNING A ORDER OVER THE 
TIMELY FILED OBJECTIONS TO SAID ORDER. 
The petitioner contends that Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration Rule 4-504 (2) gives the plaintiff five (5) 
in which to object to any proposed order. 
In the case at bar the defendant's attorney mailed a 
copy of the proposed Order On order to Show Cause to the 
plaintiff's attorney on the 3rd of July, 1990. Allowing the 
statutory time for mailing and the five day response time, 
plaintiff's objection to proposed Order was received by the 
clerk of the court on July 11, 1990 well within the time 
limits, plaintiff also filed at the same time a notice of 
hearing to hear his objections. 
Judge Sawaya apparently does not believe that plaintiff 
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has a rights to object to any of defendant proposed orders 
or findings of fact and conclusion of law, as he signed the 
July 13 order over the timely filed objections and told the 
petitioner that he would not allow objection to the January 
9 1991 Order and in fact punish the petitioner by doubling 
the amount of consecutive payment needed to reinstate his 
visitation rights when the petitioner object to defendant 
proposed finding of fact and order, stating "you may not 
like what I end up doing." "You can file objections 
thereafter, but it won't do you any good." Transcript of the 
November 26, 1990 hearing pages 10 and 21. 
The petitioner contends that all though these hearing 
and legal process Judge Sawaya demonstrated his dislike for 
the petitioner and urges this court to review the whole 
transcript of the November 26, 1990 hearing to see just how 
out of hand and unfair a judge can be. 
SHOULD THE COURT OF APPEALS USE RULE 31 OF UTAH RULES 
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURES TO PRECLUDE A WRITTEN OPINION 
ON ISSUES THAT ARE UNIQUE AND SUBSTANTIAL ? 
The Court of Appeals, sua sponte, ordered this case 
heard under Rule 31 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
and afterwards, upon Motion of the Petitioner, futher 
declined to issue a written opinion. If Utah Rule is meant 
for anything, it is for frivolous, unsubstantiated appeals 
where a written decision is unnecessary. In the case at bar 
petitioner has promulgated serious constitutional issues and 
on the issue of contempt he cannot find one case in any 
Western jurdisdiction allowing a cessation of visitation for 
non payment of child support alone. 
The petitioner contends that after careful research 
there are only four Court of Appeals cases under Rule 31 and 
that those cases each found the facts or issues too 
complicated to proceed and did not proceed under said rule. 
There are no other similar Rules in the other Western States 
researched with the exception of Washington. That rule 
(18.16) of Washington Rules of Appellate Procedures provides 
only for a joint petition for Expedited Review. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner urges that the constitutional issues raised 
and the issues of contempt power limitations are substantial 
and that the Court Of Appeals erred in not issuing a written 
opinion. 
Petitioner urges that there is n£ authority anywhere 
that all visitation and all contact may be forbidden solely 
for nonpayment of child support. 
Petitioner urges that contrary to the Court of Appeals 
oral discussion there must be some limits on the civil 
contempt power. 
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Petitioner urges that the trail courtfs order of 
conditioning of visitation and contact between father and 
his child upon payment of current and past due child support 
payment is wrong and not supported by any authoriity. 
Petitioner urges that contrary to the oral discussion 
of the Court of Appeals that in order for Rohr to have any 
meaning the best interest of the child must be the 
controlling criteria in limiting or denying visitation. Not 
just taking the best interest of the child into 
consideration or that the best interest criteria is 
fulfilled by the fact that the more money paid in support 
payments the better it is for the child. 
Respectfully submitted, 
APPENDIX 
RAP 18.15 RULES ON APPEAL 
RULE 18.15 ACCELERATED REVIEW OF 
ADULT SENTENCINGS 
(a) Generally. A sentence which is beyond the standard range 
may be reviewed in the manner provided in the Rules for other 
decisions or by accelerated review as provided in this Rule. 
(b) Accelerated Review by Motion. After the notice of appeal 
has been filed, any party may seek accelerated sentence review and 
must do so by motion. The motion must include (1) the name of the 
party filing the motion; (2) the offense; (3) the disposition of the trial 
court; (4) the standard range for the offense; (5) a statement of the 
disposition urged by the moving party; (6) copies of the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and judgment and sentence; (7) an argument for the 
relief sought with reference to that portion of RCW 9.94A.210(4) relied 
upon by the moving party. 
(c) Service on Court Reporter or Clerk. A copy of the motion 
for accelerated review must be served upon the court reporter in 
attendance at the sentencing, or, in the case of electronic recording, 
upon the clerk of the superior court. 
(d) Time for Hearing. The hearing will be conducted no later 
than 28 days following filing of the record required by RCW 
9.94A.210(5). The court will notify the parties of the hearing date. 
(e) Motion Procedure Controls. The motion procedure, includ-
ing a party's response, is governed by Title 17. 
(f) Accelerated Review of Other Issues. The decision of issues 
other than those relating to the sentence may be accelerated only 
pursuant to Rules 18.8 and 18.12. 
[Adopted effective July 1, 1984 | 
RULE 18.16 EXPEDITED APPEAL REVIEW 
(a) Purpose. This temporary rule provides for expedited review of 
certain cases on appeal. The purpose of establishing an expedited 
procedure is to reduce the time between the filing of an appeal and the 
rendering of an opinion in those cases where the parties and the court 
agree that the case can be handled in an accelerated manner. 
(b) Application of Rule. This rule applies only to an appeal to 
the Court of Appeals from a trial court decision in a civil or criminal 
case. No more than two issues can be raised in an expedited appeal. 
Each Division of the Court of Appeals may adopt procedures to imple-
ment the provisions of this rule. 
(c) Petition for Expedited Appeal Review. Parties must jointly 
petition for expedited review by filing a Petition for Expedited Review 
within 15 days after the appeal is filed. Extensions of time can be 
granted only by order of the court. The clerk of the appellate court 
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will make the standard form of petition available to persons who 
request it. 
(d) Acceptance by the Court. After review by the court, each 
petition for expedited review will be granted or denied. Petitions that 
are denied will be reviewed as provided in the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. The time limits provided in RAP 9.2, 9.5, 9.6 and 10.2 will 
begin as provided by the clerk. 
(e) Agreed Report of Proceedings. Within 30 days of notice 
that the petition was granted, the parties must file an agreed report of 
proceedings as provided in RAP 9.4. The report is limited to five pages. 
(f) Briefs Allowed. Ail briefs are limited to 10 pages and two 
issues. For the purpose of determining compliance with this rule, 
appendices are included. The title sheet, table of contents, table of 
authorities, excerpts from the clerk's papers, and copy of the court 
order or memorandum decision are not included. The brief of an 
appellant or petitioner must be filed with the appellate court within 15 
days after the agreed report of proceedings is filed. The brief of a 
respondent must be filed within 15 days after service of the brief of 
appellant or petitioner. No reply brief is allowed. Content of the 
briefs must comply with RAP 10.3(a), (b), and (g). 
(g) Filing Brief. The original of each brief must be filed with the 
appellate court in accordance with the provisions in RAP 10.4, except 
those portions of the rule relating to length of brief. 
(h) Sanctions for Late Filing. Failure to timely file the petition 
for accelerated review, the agreed report of proceedings or the brief will 
result in the case being transferred out of the expedited appeal program 
and on to the regular docket. The time limits provided in RAP 9.2, 9.5, 
9.6 and 10.2 will begin the next day after a party has missed an 
expedited appeal deadline. 
(i) Oral Argument. Oral argument will be allowed and limited to 
15 minutes for each side. Parties may request to waive oral argument. 
(j) Rendering of a Decision. Except in extraordinary circum-
stances or when a panel recommends that the opinion be published, a 
decision shall be rendered within 30 days after oral argument or, if all 
parties have waived oral argument, within 30 days after waiver has 
been approved by the panel. 
(k) Court's Authority to Accelerate Cases. The court can also 
select cases for accelerated review as provided in RAP 18.12. 
(/) Conformance to Rules of Appellate Procedure. Except 
when inconsistent with the provisions of this rule, the Rules of Appel-
late Procedure are applicable to cases on expedited appeal. 
(m) Termination. This rule will automatically terminate 24 
months from the date of adoption, unless extended by the Washington 
Supreme Court. 
[Adopted effective September 23, 1988 ] 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LLOYD D. 
vs. 
NANCY P. 
COLEY, ] 
Plaintiff, 
COLEY, 
Defendant. 
i Case No. D 81 5126 
i Judge James S. Sawaya 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(Re: Amended Order on Order to Show Cause) 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing before 
Judge James S. Sawaya on May 21, 1990 at 2:00 p.m. and was 
subsequently continued to June 18, 1990 at the hour of 2:00 p.m.. 
Defendant appeared in person with her attorney of record, 
Randall J. Holmgren. 
Plaintiff appeared in person with his attorney of record, John 
R. Bucher. 
The Court having reviewed the file, the Defendant's Motion, 
supporting Memorandum and Affidavit and the Plaintiff's Brief in 
DEC 1 t 1990 
L/wyuif <J>,tti*. 
Opposition thereto, and the Defendant's Brief in Response to the 
Plaintiff's Opposing Brief, and being fully advised, entered its 
Order on or about July 13, 1990. On appeal, the Utah Court of 
Appeals, in considering Plaintiff's Motion to Stay certain aspects 
of the Order, vacated the provisions of the Order dealing with the 
denial of child-visitation privileges and remanded the matter to 
the District Court, Judge James S. Sawaya, for entry of findings 
of fact supportive of the Order denying child-visitation. 
Consistent with the directive of the Court of Appeals, this Court 
does now make, adopt and find the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That these findings are based upon the evidence presented 
at two hearings September 1988 and June 1990. The Court has 
further considered all of the pleadings, affidavits and memoranda 
on file herein and has considered the attitude and demeanor of the 
Plaintiff as the Court has observed it on numerous occasions in 
court proceedings pertaining to this matter. 
2. That Plaintiff is in arrears in his child support, 
including interest, in the amount of $27,305.00. 
3. That nothing has changed since the Court previously 
(i.e., September 1988) found that Defendant had the present 
capability to earn money to pay child support and, if anything, it 
is more grievous than it was before. 
4. That Plaintiff made a $400 payment in November 1988 and 
a $100 payment in December 1988 but has not made any payments since 
those dates. 
5. That the aforesaid payments were made at a time when the 
Court had sentenced Plaintiff to jail for contempt for not making 
child support payments but also during a time period when the 
sentence was stayed for the purpose of giving Plaintiff an 
opportunity to purge himself of the contempt. Therefore, since the 
$500 in payments were made under such circumstances, and since no 
payments were made during the 15-16 months (approx.) since that 
time, and since no payments were made during the 3-4 years prior 
to that time, the Court finds that Plaintiff's only motivation in 
making the $500 in payments was to avoid going to jail and that he 
was not motivated out of an interest in his daughter's welfare. 
6. That Plaintiff has the capability to earn money to pay 
child support. 
7. That Plaintiff is articulate and intelligent and well-
educated. His prior work experience includes being a licensed 
real-estate broker and doing private investigatory work for local 
attorneys. 
8. That Plaintiff maintains a reasonable lifestyle. He has 
a residence which he rents. The residence is furnished with 
furniture and other furnishings. He has power and heat in his 
residence. The Court has observed his manner of dress and he 
dresses reasonably well. 
9. That Plaintiff has purchased material goods for his 
daughter (i.e., ski equipment, ski-lift tickets, etc.) so, at least 
at times, his income has been sufficient to indulge his daughter 
in such sports and/or luxuries and yet during such times he has not 
paid child support. 
10. That Plaintiff has earned money during the periods of 
time that he has not paid child support. 
11. For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that 
Plaintiff's failure to pay child support has been willful. 
12. Because the failure to pay child support has been 
willful, the Court finds that Plaintiff does not, in part, respect 
the legal system or the law requiring payment of child support. 
For that reason, the Court finds that Plaintiff"s attitudes and 
behaviors are anti-social and constitute a substantial deviation 
from the moral norms of society. A parent influences a child for 
good or bad; some of that influence comes from the child's 
observations of the parent's behavior. For these reasons, the 
Court finds that Plaintiff's behaviors and attitudes, with respect 
to not paying child support, are not a proper example for his child 
and that until Plaintiff adopts an attitude, manifest by 
appropriate behavior, that he respects the legal system and intends 
to conform with the laws of this State and the directives of the 
Court, he should not have personal contact with his daughter. In 
that regard, the Court finds that in the event that the Plaintiff 
pays his ongoing child support in the amount of $250 per month, and 
makes a monthly reduction of $200 toward the reduction of the 
judgments (child support, interest, and attorney fees) and makes 
both payments every month for a period of four (4) consecutive 
months, he may thereby reinstate his visitation rights with his 
daughter. 
As Conclusions of Law from the foregoing Findings of Fact, the 
Court finds: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Plaintiff's conduct, in not paying child support, as 
stated in the aforesaid Findings of Fact, is willful and 
contumacious within the meaning of Rohr v. Rohr. 709 P.2d 382 (Utah 
1985). Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
concludes that it is not in the best interest of the minor child 
to have visitation with the Plaintiff until such time as Plaintiff 
shows to this Court that he is concerned about the child1 s 
financial support and expresses that concern by paying his ongoing 
child support in the amount of $250 per month and making a monthly 
reduction of $200 toward the reduction of the judgments (child 
support, interest, and attorney fees) and makes both payments every 
month for a period of four (4) consecutive months. The Court 
believes that if the Plaintiff makes a serious effort to support 
his child financially and sustains that effort over a period of 
time, he will thereby demonstrate rehabilitation of the attitude 
and behavior defects, identified above, that led this Court to deny 
Plaintiff visitation and contact with the minor child. If 
Plaintiff thereafter fails to make such payments, without making 
a clear showing of changed circumstances, the Court shall, without 
further hearing, suspend visitation. 
DATED this // day of 19. 
BY THE COURT: 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LLOYD D. 
vs. 
NANCY P. 
COLEY, ] 
Plaintiff, 
COLEY, 
Defendant. 
i Case No. D 81 5126 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
AMENDED ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
(June 18, 1990) 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing before 
Judge James S. Sawaya on May 21. 1990 at 2:00 p.m. and was 
subsequently continued to June 18, 1990 at the hour of 2:00 p.m.. 
Defendant was represented by counsel, Randall J. Holmgren. 
Plaintiff was represented by counsel, John R. Bucher. 
The Court having reviewed the file, the Defendant's Motion, 
supporting Memorandum and Affidavit and the Plaintiff's Brief in 
Opposition thereto, and the Defendant's Brief in Response to the 
Plaintiff's Opposing Brief, and being fully advised, entered its 
Order on or about July 13, 1990. On appeal, the Utah Court of 
Appeals, in considering Plaintiff's Motion to Stay certain aspects 
of the Order, vacated the provisions of the Order dealing with the 
denial of child-visitation privileges and remanded the matter to 
the District Court, Judge James S. Sawaya, for entry of findings 
of fact supportive of the Order denying child-visitation. On 
December 11, 1990, Judge James S. Sawaya signed the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and based upon those Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law I 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Judgment is granted against Plaintiff and in favor of 
Defendant in the principal amount of $27,305.00. This judgment 
includes all child support arrearages ($5,500.00: (9/30/88-
5/30/90), pre-judgment interest (10%) on said delinquent child 
support ($481.03: 9/30/88-5/30/90) and all former judgments against 
Plaintiff and in favor of Defendant ($16,234.48: 4/30/86-1/9/89) 
and the same are hereby merged herein, together with post-judgment 
interest (12%) on said judgments ($5,089.49: 4/30/86-1/9/89). 
2. Plaintiff LLOYD D. COLEY is hereby ordered in contempt 
of this Court and the orders of this Court and he is ordered to 
serve a term of not less than 30 days in the Salt Lake County Jail. 
However, the jail sentence is suspended for thirty (30) days at 
which time the court will review the Plaintiff's efforts in making 
2 
a substantial payment to Defendant for the above judgments. 
3. Plaintiff's visitation rights with the minor child, 
Laura, are hereby terminated until such time as Plaintiff shows to 
this Court that he is concerned about the child's financial support 
and expresses that concern by paying his ongoing child support in 
the amount of $250.00 per month and making a monthly reduction of 
$200.00 toward the reduction of the judgments (child support, 
interest, and attorney fees) and makes both payments every month 
for a period of four (4) consecutive months. 
4. If Plaintiff thereafter fails to make such payments, 
without making a clear showing of changed circumstances, the Court 
shall, without further hearing, again terminate visitation. 
5. Plaintiff is hereby restrained from having any contact 
with Defendant or her daughter, Laura. 
6. This matter is continued to July 16, 1990 at 2:00 p.m. 
said will be continued by the court periodically for the next six 
months or a year. 
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7. Judgment is granted against Plaintiff and in favor of 
Defendant in the amount of $400.00 for attorney fees and $30.00 in 
costs incurred by Defendant in bringing this proceeding before the 
Court. 
Date: , 19 . 
BY THE COURT: 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I personally caused to be mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED ORDER Off ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE (June 18, 1990), postage prepaid, to the following, on 
January 8, 1991. 
Lloyd D. Coley, Pro Se 
1065 Lake Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Lloyd D. Coley, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v, 
Nancy P. Coley, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
FEB.. 43991 
fifty T. Noonar 
Cleri< of the Coun 
Utah Court of Appeals 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 900446-CA 
F I L E D 
(February 4, 1991) 
Before Judges Orme, Garff and Bench (on Law and Motion) 
This matter is before the court on a Motion To Stay 
Pending Review seeking a stay of a trial court's order dated 
January 9, 1991 denying appellant visitation with his minor 
child pending satisfaction of specified conditions. We deny 
the motion. In October, 1990, this court heard argument and 
issued an order on a previous motion to stay the July 13, 1990 
order of the Third District Court that denied appellant 
visitation with the minor child until further order of the 
trial court. This court entered the following orders, dated 
October 10, 1990: 
1. That those provisions of the July 
13, 1990 order denying appellant 
visitation and contact with the parties' 
minor child are vacated, subject to the 
further order of the trial court entered 
pursuant to this order. 
2. That [the] case is temporarily 
remanded to the trial court for entry of 
an order on visitation supported by (1) 
factual findings as to the welfare of the 
child, as required by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-5(4) (1989) and Rohr v. Rohr, 709 
P.2d 382, 383 (Utah 1985), and (2) 
provisions as to the specific acts 
required of appellant to obtain an order 
reinstating visitation and contact 
privileges. 
3. That this court retains 
jurisdiction to review any order of the 
trial court entered pursuant to this 
order during the pending appeal and 
appellant shall not be required to file 
an additional notice of appeal or pay-
additional filing fees. 
On December 11, 1990 the trial court entered Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to the provisions of this 
court's October 10, 1990 order set forth above. The findings 
are based upon the evidence presented at the hearings in 
September 1988 and June 1990, the trial court record and the 
attitude and demeanor of appellant in court proceedings. The 
findings specify the trial court's factual basis for denying 
visitation and set forth the prerequisites for reestablishing 
visitation. The court found that appellant is in arrears in 
child support in the amount of $27,305.00. Based upon the 
factual findings, the trial court concludes: 
The plaintiff's conduct, in not paying 
child support . . . is willful and 
contumacious within the meaning of Rohr 
v. Rohr, 709 P.2d 382 (Utah 1985). Based 
on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the 
court concludes that it is not in the 
best interest of the minor child to have 
visitation with the plaintiff until such 
time as plaintiff shows to this court 
that he is concerned about the child's 
financial support and expresses that 
concern by paying his ongoing child 
support in the amount of $250 per month 
and making a monthly reduction of $200 
toward the reduction of the judgments 
(child support, interest, and attorney 
fees) and makes both payments every month 
for a period of four (4) consecutive 
months. The court believes that if the 
plaintiff makes a serious effort to 
support his child financially and 
sustains that effort over a period of 
time, he will thereby demonstrate 
rehabilitation of the attitude and 
behavior defects, identified above, that 
led this court to deny plaintiff 
visitation and contact with the minor 
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child. If plaintiff thereafter fails to 
make such payments, without making a 
clear showing of changed circumstances, 
the court shall, without further hearing, 
suspend visitation. 
Appellant now seeks a stay of the December, 1990 order as 
supported by the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
entered pursuant to this court's temporary remand. The issue 
before this court is whether appellant is entitled to a stay 
pending appeal under the criteria set forth in Jensen v. 
Schwendiman, 744 P.2d 1026 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Under Rule 
8(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure as interpreted in 
Jensen v. Schwendiman, a party seeking a stay must (a) make a 
strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits of 
the appeal; (b) establish that unless a stay is granted he will 
suffer irreparable injury; (c) show that no substantial harm 
will come to other interested parties; and (d) show that a stay 
would do no harm to the public interest. Jensen, 744 P.2d at 
1027. 
Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in 
amending its July order because such amendment must have been 
done within ten days under Utah R. App. P. 52(b) and 59. This 
argument is wholly meritless since the amendment was pursuant 
to a specific remand of this court. Appellant further claims 
that the amended order is not in conformity with this court's 
October 1990 order or Rohr v. Rohr, disputes the factual 
findings, asserts that the trial court was required to hold a 
further evidentiary hearing, and apparently claims that the 
finding that he has shown disrespect for the court system 
inhibits appellant's constitutional right of free speech. 
Appellant argues generally that this case is distinguishable 
from Rohr. 
Based on our review of the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and appellant's arguments summarized above, 
we conclude that appellant has failed to make an adequate 
showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits and is not 
entitled to a stay on that basis. Appellant has failed to 
specifically address the remaining criteria of Jensen, and we 
do not address them in detail. This court recognizes that 
deprivation of visitation for failure to provide financial 
support is an extreme remedy requiring a trial court to conform 
with the criteria set forth in Rohr v. Rohr and to balance the 
potential harm to the parent/child relationship with the 
potential harm to the child from the willful failure to provide 
financial support. The ultimate determination of whether the 
trial court in this case has satisfied those requirements is 
reserved for plenary presentation and consideration of this 
case. We rule, however, that appellant has failed to sat sfy 
the burden of establishing his entitlement to a stay pending 
appeal under the circumstances of this case, which include the 
availability of a mechanism for purging contempt and 
reestablishing contact and visitation. The motion for further 
stay pending appeal is denied. 
One additional point requires clarification. Appellant 
asserts that this court held that "appellant may review 
subsequent orders in these proceedings without a new notice of 
appeals or additional filing fees." The October 10, 1990 order 
provided only that this court retained jurisdiction to review 
orders entered pursuant to the temporary remand. Appellant is, 
accordingly, not required to file a notice of appeal or 
additional filing fee to obtain review of the December, 1990 
order entered pursuant to remand. Any subsequent appeals of 
unrelated orders, including judgments for arrearages or 
contempt, are subject to all appellate rules and requirements. 
ALL CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
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1/ LLOYD D. COLEY, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I DELIVER A 
TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE OFFICE OF: 
RANDALL HOLGREM 
50 WEST BROADWAY 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
DATED THIS DAY OF 1991. 
LLOYD D. COLEY 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Lloyd D. Coley, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Nancy P. Coley, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Orme (Rule 31) 
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Case No. 900446-Otafeft^ClAppMte 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court pursuant to Utah R. App. 
31 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment of the trial 
court, contained in the Amended Order on Order to Show Cause 
entered on January 9, 1991 and based upon findings of fact and 
conclusions of law entered on December 11, 1990, is affirmed, 
and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a hearing on the appellant's 
petition for modification of divorce decree filed April 14, 
1986, insofar as it seeks a reduction in child support, shall 
be scheduled at the earliest available date, and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that,pending disposition by the 
trial court of the request to modify child support, all orders 
of the trial court pertaining to visitation and child support 
shall remain in full force and effect and, in particular, 
appellant's obligation to pay child support in the amounts and 
on the schedule set forth by the trial court shall not be 
altered or suspended by this order. 
DATED this day of August, 1991. 
ALL CONCUR: 
$ * & ! • & 
JMith M. Billings, 
Associate Presiding J 
C?*-n^£St 
Pamela T. Gree 
> ^ < 
Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 15th day of August, 1991, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United 
States mail to the party listed below: 
Lloyd D. Coley 
1065 Lake Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
Randall J, Holmsgren 
Attorney for Appellee 
50 West Broadway, Suite 1111 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Dated this 15th day of August, 1991. 
Deputy /Clerk 
